





















































































































The future of the Franco-German tandem
Artur Ciechanowicz, Rafał Sadowski
Following the victories of François Hollande in the presidential election and 
the Socialist Party in the parliamentary election, the existing model of re-
lations between Germany and France as symbolised by the Merkel-Sarkozy 
duo is undergoing a transformation. Along with the defeat for Sarkozy, who 
had fostered close cooperation with the German Chancellor, we are witnes-
sing a change in the German-French modus operandi, which was based on 
making confidential agreements concerning the anti-crisis measures in the 
eurozone and then presenting ready-made solutions to other EU members 
(as in the case of the successive versions of the document currently known 
as the fiscal pact).
However, a conflict in bilateral relations, which would mean a total bre-
akdown of the Franco-German engine, is rather unlikely. In fact, François 
Hollande’s proposals have diminished the appearance of the two states’ 
exceptional compatibility, and have restored the specific relationship af-
fected by the natural rivalry between two states, who because of their eco-
nomies’ different orientation have divergent interests. Nevertheless, both 
sides are destined to reach a compromise, as neither can attain its goals 
in the face of the other’s opposition. In the long term, Hollande is likely to 
maintain a common front with Germany in fighting the crisis, while at the 
same time trying (with his allies from the south of the EU) to limit Berlin’s 
political and economic superiority.

















lost	 its	 highest	 credit	 rating.	 The	 change	 affected	 both	 bilateral	 relations	with	Germany	













to	 the	 issue	 of	 so-called	 project	 bonds,	
which	 would	 be	 used	 for	 infrastructural	
investments.	However,	this	is	not	enough	
for	 France,	 which	 wants	 access	 to	 the	
cheapest	loans	in	order	to	reduce	the	risk	
of	 speculation	 and	 lower	 the	 debt	 cost	
differences	 among	 the	 eurozone	 states2.	
At	the	informal	EU	summit	in	Brussels	on	















ture,	 such	 as	 lowering	 the	 retirement	 age	 to	 60	 (although	Hollande	 keeps	 promising	 to	
reduce	the	budget	deficit).
A reconfiguration of alliances
Hollande’s	 strategy	 involves	 departing	 from	 the	 close	 coordination	 of	 action	 exclusively	
with	 the	 Germans	while	 ignoring	 the	 remaining	 EU	members,	 as	 was	 demonstrated	 by	




François Hollande has altered 
the policy of his predecessor. 
To be more precise, he has actually 
returned to Sarkozy’s style of policies 
who was opposing Merkel on most 
issues regarding the anti-crisis 























be	 seen	 as	 a	 demonstration	 that	 Angela	
Merkel’s	 government	 is	 not	 his	 only	Ger-










Back to the old sticking points in the Franco-German relations
In	the	long	term,	the	relations	between	Merkel	and	Hollande	will	not	be	shaped	solely	by	the	
anti-crisis	policies.	There	are	many	areas	where	both	states	have	had	a	completely	divergent	




otaged	 the	 German	 plan	 to	 appoint	Wolfgang	 Schäuble,	 Germany’s	minister	 of	 finance,	
as	president	of	the	Eurogroup.	A	week	before	the	summit,	France	indicated	that	it	would	
put	up	 its	own	candidate	 for	 this	position,	the	finance	minister	Pierre	Moscovici.	Germa-


















Jacques	Chirac’s	 term.	The	 rivalry	between	managers	 from	Germany	and	France	 for	 the	
decisive	voice	in	the	company	is	far	more	than	just	a	matter	of	prestige.	Berlin	is	(rightly)	
Hollande’s strategy involves depart-
ing from the close coordination of 
action exclusively with the Germans 
while ignoring the remaining EU 
members. In order to put pressure 
on the Germans, the French leader 
has established a close cooperation 
with Spain and Italy.























































concerned	that	 if	 the	French	prevail,	 then	defence	 factories	 located	 in	Germany	will	 lose	
their	importance,	employees	may	be	laid	off,	and	Germany	may	be	cut	off	from	new	tech-
nologies4.















ing	between	Merkel	and	Sarkozy	 in	Meseberg,	 the	 then	French	president	stated	 that	his	
country	 perceives	 nuclear	 power	 as	 the	
energy	 of	 the	 future,	 and	 he	 could	 not	
imagine	 Germans	 going	 the	 other	 way.	
An	 indirect	 response	was	 given	 to	 him	by	
Sigmar	 Gabriel,	 Germany’s	 then	 environ-
ment	minister;	in	an	interview	for	the	Tages- 









Different visions of Europe













There are many areas where 
both states have had a completely 
divergent positions for years; 
but the priority of fighting the finan-
cial crisis has made these issues 
secondary in the public debate. 
However, they did affect the dynam-
ics of Franco-German relations 
even during Sarkozy’s term of office.




















































ernance	 in	 the	EU	and	 the	strengthening	





within	 the	 ruling	Socialist	Party,	which	 includes	 the	 foreign	minister	 Laurent	 Fabius	 and	
the	junior	minister	for	European	affairs	Bernard	Cazeneuve.
Forecast












•	 The	 victory	 for	 the	 Socialist	 Party	 in	 the	 June	 elections	 has	 given	 it	 a	 parliamentary	







Despite all differences – and often, 
paradoxically, due to them – 
Germany and France will remain 
the moving spirit of the EU. 
These two states, backed by their 
allies, are bound to set the tone 
in the debate about the EU’s future.
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